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RECENSIONS 
D'un point de vue général, et malgré toutes les réserves du lecteur pour qui ce livre ne concilie 
pas assez « le cognitif à l'ethnographique » (l'expression est de Maurice Bloch), la thèse de Pascal 
Boyer demeure très stimulante pour la recherche. Il faut reconnaître que l'auteur s'est assigné une 
tâche difficile, de longue haleine et à géométrie variable : ébaucher une approche des représenta-
tions religieuses qui écarte, d'une part, les dogmes de l'ultra-relativisme et réintègre, d'autre part, 
les processus cognitif s et les mécanismes complexes de l'esprit humain. 
Frédéric LAUGRAND 
Université Laval, Québec 
Denis J.M. BRADLEY, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Washington, DC, The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997, xrv-610 p. 
Denis Bradley, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, has published many essays on 
the relationship of philosophy and theology. The focus of the present book is a further instance of 
that general theme, namely, the relationship of philosophical and theological considerations of 
morality in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The book as a whole constitutes an argument for a bold 
thesis, namely, that there is no such thing as an authentically Thomist systematic moral philosophy. 
According to Bradley, Aquinas' systematic account of human agents portrays them as naturally 
desiring a supernatural goal, namely, the vision of God — Father, Son, and Spirit. That systematic 
account, however, is theological rather than philosophical ; for it presupposes the Christian be-
liever's affirmation of God. Insofar as a Thomist considers matters just philosophically, thus 
prescinding from the supernatural goal toward which humans are oriented, she arrives at a paradox 
rather than a systematic account. Why ? Because Aquinas, by contrast with Aristotle, envisages a 
natural goal that, if achieved, would satisfy humans only imperfectly at best — hence the paradox 
of a natural desire for which no perfect natural satisfaction is possible. In short, if a Thomist ethics 
is systematic, it is theological ; but if it is philosophical, it is paradoxical rather than systematic. 
The thesis Bradley presents is bold because, as he himself shows in detail, it contravenes a 
good deal of the "received wisdom" regarding Aquinas' moral science. The profundity and nuance 
of this thesis situates Bradley on the cutting edge of Thomist scholarship. (It strikes me that the 
thesis parallels one expounded earlier, albeit far more briefly, by Bernard Lonergan ; but Bradley 
does not seem to have been influenced by Lonergan in this regard. See "The Natural Desire to See 
God," in Collection : Papers by Bernard Lonergan [London, 1967 ; and Toronto, 1988].) Moreo-
ver, the methodological implications of his suggested rethinking are important not just for Thomists 
but for all philosophers and, indeed, academic investigators in general. By urging that if one is to 
appreciate the systematic integrity of Aquinas' ethical conclusions one must attend to the proce-
dural integrity of Aquinas' investigative methods, Bradley contributes to the scholarly community's 
growing recognition that the fundamental criteria of sound scholarship reside on the level not of 
abstract normative principles but rather of concrete normative practices. (Bradley himself alludes 
obliquely to this connection on p. xm.) 
Bradley's actual elaboration of his argument is masterful. He complements and clarifies his 
thorough treatment of Aquinas with careful discussions of Aristotle, Aquinas' all-important prede-
cessor, and Jacques Maritain and Santiago Ramirez, two influential twentieth-century successors. 
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He displays a broad and deep familiarity with the relevant classical, medieval, and modern scholar-
ship. And his text is well organized, meticulously developed, and lucidly written. It is my judgment 
that this book is likely to have an important positive impact upon Thomist scholarship, especially in 
the area of moral studies, and perhaps upon more general scholarly methodology as well. 
Michael VERTIN 
St. Michael's College, University of Toronto 
Patrick H. BYRNE, Analysis and Science in Aristotle. Albany, NY, State University of New York 
Press, 1997, xxi-303 p. 
Patrick Byrne is Professor of Philosophy at Boston College. From his first days as a graduate 
student, his philosophical outlook has been influenced profoundly by the writings of Bernard 
Lonergan. Hence, given Lonergan's prolonged attention to epistemology, it is not surprising that 
most of Byrne's published papers have been centrally concerned with epistemological topics. The 
present book continues this trend. However, unlike the bulk of Byrne's previous work, it proceeds 
less by direct systematic argumentation than by historical analysis and interpretation. Specifically, it 
treats certain fundamental epistemological issues by exploring just how those issues are addressed 
by Aristotle. 
The chief findings of Byrne's eight chapters are roughly the following. First, by contrast with 
many past and present-day accounts of Aristotle, "analysis" for Aristotle is not fundamentally the 
process of reducing a whole to its parts ; rather, it is the process from parts to the intelligible whole 
of which they are the parts. Second, "syllogism" is the fundamental form of valid argument — the 
fundamental form of expressing the necessary intelligible connections between the statement with 
which one begins and certain other statements that may be brought to light. Third, there are, on 
Aristotle's arrangement, three basic syllogistic figures. All proper but problematic statements, 
whether compact or complex, can in principle be reconfigured in terms of these three ; and all 
improper statements can be manifested as improper by being shown to fail at making the intelligible 
connections expressed by these three. Fourth, Aristotle presents his account not simply as articulat-
ing analysis as the process of discerning intelligible connections between conclusions and premises 
but also and more basically as articulating science (epistêmê) as certain knowledge of things in 
terms of their causes. Fifth, on the Aristotelian account of how scientific knowledge emerges, the 
crucial moment is one's preconceptual grasp of what subsequently is formulated as the middle term. 
This preconceptually discovered intelligible connection, rather than the antecedent sensations or the 
subsequent concepts, is what is key. Sixth, the typical Aristotelian scientific approach is not to 
begin with a principle (expressed by the syllogistic major premise) and a middle term (attributed by 
the syllogistic minor premise) and then deduce a fact (expressed by the syllogistic conclusion). On 
the contrary, it is to begin with a demonstrable fact and then seek to discover a middle term and a 
principle in terms of which that fact may be understood. Seventh, the ultimate principle of all 
scientific knowing is not itself a proposition ; rather, it is nous, the pre-propositional background or 
horizon within which our knowing proceeds — at root, the self-understanding of intelligence itself. 
Eighth, Aristotle not only develops a methodology of analysis and science but also develops actual 
sciences grounded in the normativity of nous ; and his regular aim in these enterprises is not 
(despite common misconceptions to the contrary) to demonstrate conclusions but rather to under-
stand matters of fact. 
Analysis and Science in Aristotle is clearly and sensitively organized, tightly reasoned, and 
very well written. Substantively, although Byrne refers to Lonergan only a few times in his actual 
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